On May 26, 2024, a potentially catastrophic accident was narrowly avoided when a track maintenance trolley ran away downhill for over a kilometer before colliding with equipment at a railway worksite in Cheshire.
While no injuries occurred, this incident highlights significant safety concerns regarding equipment design, operational procedures, and organizational oversight within railway maintenance operations.
Incident Overview and Timeline
The incident occurred at approximately 05:00 on Sunday, May 26, 2024, at North Rode, Cheshire, during planned maintenance work on the railway line between Macclesfield and Congleton.
A manual track trolley being used to transport equipment ran away downhill toward a group of track workers, reaching speeds of approximately 20 mph (32 km/h).
The runaway trolley traveled approximately 1,100 meters before colliding with a rail-carrying trolley (known as an “ironman”) that was holding a piece of replacement rail.
Incident Occurred During Scheduled Engineering
The work was being conducted during a scheduled engineering possession of both railway lines (the Up Stoke and Down Stoke), which had begun at 00:10 and was planned to continue until 08:30.
The trolley had been initially pushed uphill from the worksite to an access point to collect equipment. During its return journey to the worksite, the trolley became unbraked while on a downhill gradient with an average slope of 1 in 176.
Fortunately, the site supervisor and the controller of site safety (COSS) spotted the runaway trolley approaching and shouted warnings that allowed all personnel to clear the track before impact.
While no injuries resulted, the collision damaged both the runaway trolley and the ironman equipment at the worksite.
The Work Environment and Context
The railway at North Rode consists of two electrified running lines, powered by 25kV overhead electrification. The maintenance work on the day of the incident involved multiple work sites within the overall possession between Macclesfield and Congleton stations.
A recent railway maintenance incident in North Rode highlights the importance of safety protocols and equipment design in preventing catastrophic situations.
Specifically, the incident was influenced by the site’s geography, where a downhill gradient contributed to the trolley’s acceleration.
Consequently, the incident underscores the need for improved ergonomics, failsafe mechanisms, and clear leadership structures to ensure worker safety. Fortunately, timely warnings from supervisory staff prevented injuries.
Technical Factors and Root Causes
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) identified several key factors that contributed to this incident. These findings reveal concerning issues with equipment design, operational practices, and safety management.
Immediate Cause and Technical Failures
The primary cause of the runaway was identified as the trolley becoming unbraked while on a downhill gradient after the operator intentionally defeated the “failsafe” function of the trolley’s braking system.
The investigation found that the design of the trolley made it possible for operators to bypass critical safety features, and the trolley operator was aware of this possibility.
Worn Out Equipment
The ergonomics of the trolley brake system were found to be problematic, creating operator fatigue when used as designed. This fatigue likely encouraged the operator to defeat the braking mechanism.
Additionally, the operator lacked awareness that this action created a runaway risk in this specific location with its downhill gradient.
The trolley involved was manufactured by Specialist Tools & Equipment Ltd (STEL) and had been purchased new by Rhomberg Sersa Rail Group Ltd (RSRG) in October 2023, just seven months before the incident.
Despite its recent manufacture, the design allowed critical safety features to be bypassed.
Organizational and Management Factors
The RAIB investigation identified two significant underlying factors that contributed to the incident:
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Network Rail’s product acceptance process failed to adequately manage the risks associated with this design of trolley. This suggests deficiencies in how railway equipment is evaluated before being approved for use on the network.
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Lack of clarity in site leadership roles led to ineffective risk management. The investigation noted that multiple individuals had supervisory or leadership designations, potentially creating confusion about ultimate responsibility for safety decisions.
A third probable underlying factor was that the defeating of the braking system on this type of trolley was a known issue throughout the industry, yet no effective action had been taken to eliminate the practice.
This represents a significant missed opportunity to address a recognized safety risk before it resulted in an incident.
Organizational Structure and Responsibilities
Several organizations were involved in the work being conducted at North Rode when the incident occurred, creating a complex web of responsibilities and oversight:
Main Organizations
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Network Rail owned and maintained the railway infrastructure and employed the person in charge of the overall possession.
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Rhomberg Sersa Rail Group Ltd (RSRG) served as the principal contractor, planning and carrying out the work. They owned the trolley involved and supplied other tools and equipment.
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OnPoint Trac Ltd employed the trolley operator and all track workers involved, including the team leader and COSS.
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Specialist Tools & Equipment Ltd (STEL) designed and manufactured the trolley.
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Sunbelt Rentals Ltd was contracted by RSRG to service the brakes on the trolley.
Personnel Hierarchy
The work structure included several layers of supervision and responsibility:
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A senior site supervisor from RSRG was responsible for planning the work, arranging staffing, and preparing equipment. This individual directly supervised two of the four planned sites of work and was perceived as the overall person in charge for RSRG.
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The site supervisor at the accident location was identified by track workers as being in charge of the immediate work group. This person had 18 years of railway experience and had been building supervisory experience with RSRG over the previous four years.
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The Controller of Site Safety (COSS) was responsible for ensuring a safe system of work to protect staff from train movements. This individual was also designated as the Person in Charge (PIC) in the documentation, creating potential confusion about ultimate authority.
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A Team Leader directed the activities of four track workers at the site.
This complex arrangement of responsibilities may have contributed to unclear lines of authority regarding safety decisions and equipment usage.
Recommendations and Industry Learning
Following its investigation, the RAIB issued two formal recommendations, both directed to Network Rail:
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Network Rail, in conjunction with the Rail Safety and Standards Board and the M&EE Networking Group, should reduce the likelihood of failsafe brakes on trolleys being modified and rendered ineffective. This recommendation includes considering modern ergonomic practices and reviewing the product acceptance process to identify and implement control measures to prevent trolley misuse.
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Network Rail should improve the implementation of safety learning resulting from accident and incident investigations.
Additionally, the RAIB identified two important learning points:
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The importance of staff not rendering braking systems ineffective when working with trolleys of this type.
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The importance of controllers of site safety accompanying work groups to personally observe and advise them.
In Conclusion
Sources: Rail Accident Investigation Branch.
Prepared by Ivan Alexander Golden, Founder of THX News™, an independent news organization delivering timely insights from global official sources. Combines AI-analyzed research with human-edited accuracy and context.
